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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WENDELL "\V. MOTTER and 
BETTY F. MOTTER his wife 
' ' 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
RUSSELL R. BATEMAN and 
MYRNA GAYE BATEMAN 
' his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case 
No. 10552 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by plaintiffs to recover the balance 
due on a written contract for the sale of a business and 
rental of a building, and counteraction by defendants for 
rescission of the contract and return of monies paid 
thereon. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury in the Fifth Judicial 
District, St. George, Utah. Defendants now appeal from 
a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. 
1 
Defendants' ~lotion for .Judgment N otwithstamli11 ~ 
the Verdict and l\Iotion for N cw Trial ·was denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Statement of Facts contained in Appellanfa' 
Brief is incomplete and entirely misleading. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants were residents of San Diego, California, 
where defendant Russell R. Bateman had been employed 
for approximately eight years as an Electrical Test De-
sign Engineer for General Dynamics. He was 31 years 
old and very familiar with electrical equipment, and a col-
lege graduate. 
On August 24, 1961, Mr. Bateman was in St. George, 
Utah, and visited with Mr. Motter, a casual acquaintance. 
Mr. Motter was sole proprietor of a business known by 
the name and style of Motter Electric. 
On August 24, 1961, and for several days thereafter, 
defendant Russell R. Bateman and plaintiff Wendell W. 
Motter had almost continuous discussions relative to the 
purchase of the furniture, fixtures, automotive equipment, 
franchises, inventory, and stock in trade of Motter Elec-
tric Co., located in a building owned by plaintiffs in St. 
George, Utah. These discussions included at least one 
conference between defendant Bateman and Dexter Sno·w, 
St. George C.P.A., who had been instructed by plaintiff 
Wendell Motter to make available to Mr. Bateman all 
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records pertaining to the business, including book in-
ventory, sales volume, profits, book value of furnishings 
and fixtures. The,se items had a total book value of 
$27,994.44 as of August 31, 1961 (T. 130, L. 10 to and 
including T. 130, L. 19). 
As a result of these conversations and investigations 
by Bateman, on August 28, 1961, plaintiffs Motter and 
defendants Bateman entered into a contract of sale 
which provided, among other conditions, ''That Bate-
man shall pay for the said business, furniture, fixtures, 
inventory, signs, franchises, truck, and Fiat automobile, 
the sum of $25,000.00. That the said items sold hereby 
shall be such items as are now in said building, which 
items have been approved and are accepted by the said 
Bateman." (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2, par. 2.) 
Def enclants took possession of the business Septem-
ber 1, 1961, and continued in possession until January 
27, 1962. On January 27, 1962, defendants mailed plain-
tiffs a Notice of Rescission, dated January 27, 1.962 arid 
received by plaintiffs on February 2, 1962, alleging there-
in certain purported statements made by plaintiff Wendell 
W. l\fotter, allegedly made prior to August 28, 1961, 
which statements apparently were the basis for def end-
ants' attempted rescission. 
However, on or about .January 25, 1.962, plaintiffs 
Motter served upon defendants Bateman a Notice of 
Default (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 9) in the terms of the Con-
tract. Thus, prior to the time of the attempted rescission, 
defendants Bateman had been served with written notice 
of their default under the contract. 
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On or about December 25, 1961, defendant Russell R. 
Bateman verbally informed plaintiff Wendell ~[otter 
that he, Bateman, was "not making it and I have ~ot to 
give it back to you." (T. 32, L. 7 to and including T. 32, 
L. 20.) Defendant began to sell and move the merchan-
dise out (T. 32, L. 21 to and including T. 33, L. 3), (T. 
72, L. 22 to and including T. 73, L. 7). Defendants re-
fused plaintiffs' offer to help liquidate the business (T. 
75, L. 8 to and including T. 76, L. 2), and finally walked 
out of the transaction on or about February 4, 1962 (T. 
94, L. 20 to and including T. 94, L. 24). Several months 
after defendants closed the business, they mailed plai11-
tiff s Motter an Inventory (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 9), ·which 
purported to be a list of inventory and equipment left in 
the building by defendants when they had departed the 
premises. 
Plaintiffs gave defendants credit on the rontract 
payments due· for all monies received under the contract; 
for the full value of defendants' purported inventory 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 9), and filed this action on December 
27, 1962 to recover the balance due on the contract of 
sale ($7,104.43) and the balance due on rental of the build-
ing up to the time a new tenant was obtained ($2,400.00). 
On February 7, 1964, defendants filed an answer and 
counterclaim for rescission and return of $7,056.75, paid 
by Bateman prior to breaching the Contract of Sale. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO INSTRUC-
TION NO. 7 IS NOT WELL TAKEN FOR THE 
FOLLOWING REASONS: 
1. THERE IS NO TESTIMONY OR PROFFER 
OF TESTIMONY IN THE TRANSCRIPT 
THAT THERE WAS ANY DISPARITY IN 
EXPERIENCE OR INTELLIGENCE BE-
TWEEN PLAINTIFF WENDELL W. MOT-
TER AND DEFENDANT RUSSELL R. 
BATEMAN, WHICH WOULD MAKE DE-
FENDANT BATEMAN MORE SUSCEPTI-
BLE TO FRAUD THAN THE ORDINARY 
PRUDENT PERSON. ALL OF THE TESTI-
MONY IS TO THE CONTRARY. 
A. DEFENDANT RUSSELL R. BATEMAN 
WAS A TEST EQUIPMENT DESIGN 
ENGINEER (T. 72, L. 2 TO AND IN-
CLUDING T. 7, L. 19). 
B. DEFENDANTRUSSELLR.BATEMAK 
WAS 31 YEARS OF AGE AT THE TIME 
HE EXECUTED THE CONTRACT (T. 
161, L. 5 TO AND INCLUDING T. 161, 
L. 7). 
C. DEFENDANT WAS EITHER A COL-
LEGE GRADUATE OR COMPLETING 
COLLEGE (T. 23, L. 7 TO AND INCLUD-
ING T. 23, L. 7), AND FAMILIAR WITH 
ELE1CTRICAL EQUIPMENT. 
Before the issue of disparity of experience between 
the plaintiff vVendell W. Motter and defendant Russell 
R. Batman was an issue in this action, defendants were 
obligated to prove: 
5 
(1) False representation of a material fact; 
(2) Knowledge of its falsity, or culpable ignorance 
of its truth; 
(3) With intent that it should he acted on by the 
party deceived; and 
( 4) Inducing him to contract to his injury. 
(17 C.J.S., p. 905, par. 153.) 
The court's Instruction No. 7 correctly stated the 
elements the jury should take into consideration in deter-
mining the presence of fraud in the inducement, or lack 
of it. To enlarge, or attempt to further define categor-
ies of susceptibility of defendant to fraud would have 
opened a ''Pandora's Box'' of presumptions to fl:v in the 
face of the ''Ordinary Prudent Person'' presumption, 
which is a basic cornerstone of the la\v of contracts. 
Defendant's feeble attempt to prove undue influence 
("defendant Motter (sic) was a very good friend of (1e-
f endant 's brother") or a confidential relationship be-
tween the parties ("the defendant Russell Bateman had 
knmx.'11 the plaintiff \Vendell Motter since 1950") must 
fall of its own weig-ht, due to a lack of any fo111.idation 
in fact. 
The Utah case of De Frees v. Carr, 8 Utah 488, :i::l 
Pac. 217 (1893), quoted at length in defendants' hrief 
under Point I, is quoted out of context, and def enc1a11ts 
should have copied into their brief the opening sentence, 
"One whose mind has become enfeebled by epileptir nt-
tacks, * * *." There is no similarity to the present casr. 
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'r11e final answer to the spurious argument contained 
in defendants' brief, Point I, is that when the junT re-
turned for explanation of "Question N'" o. 5," thev had 
obviously answered Question No. 3, "No." The 01ily thing 
left to determine then was the finding hy the court that 
the contract was valid. 
"* * * to entitle one to relief from his contract 
on the ground of fraud all t71e elements of fraud 
1n11st exist, and where an essential element is ab-
sent one may not avoid his contract on such 
ground." (Emphasis added.) (17 C .. J.S. Con-
tracts, sec. 154, p. 907.) 
Also: 
"* * * written contracts between parties deal-
ing on a parity are not to be set aside without 
clear proof of fraud calling for judicial interf er-
ence." (17 C . .J.S. Contracts, sec. 154, p. 907.) 
POINT II. 
AFTER DELIBERATING SEVERAL HOURS, 
THE .JURY RETURNED TO THE COURT-
ROOM AND PRESENTED THE rouRT A 
WRITTEN QUESTION (T. 173, L. 21 TO AND 
INCLUDING T. 173, L. 27): 
"WE ARE DIVIDED ON QUESTION .5. 
PLEASE EXPLAIN WHAT EFFECT THIS 
TVTLL HAVE ON THE FOLLOWING QUES-
TIONS TN REGARD TO THE VERDICT." 
(Emphasis Added.) 
The jury did not ask for the effect the answer to 
Question No. 3 would have on the follo?Cing auestions. 
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Obviously, they had already answered Question No. 3 _ 
''Did the plaintiff Wend ell \V. 1'.Iotter, prior to the exe-
cution of said documents by the defendants, willfull!· 
make any false representation to the defendants of and 
concerning the said business, with intention that the de-
fendants would rely thereon?'' 
The question had at this time been answered "No," 
and was answered "No," on the final verdict. The ver-
dict and Answer to Special Interrogatories show no e,·i-
dence of ha Ying been changed. \Vi th Question Ko. :1 
answered in the negatiYe, the only question left to answer 
was Question No. 7, an arithmetical computation 011ly. 
based on the evidence submitted by plaintiff and nen·r 
controYerted by defendants. 
Whateyer the source of the jury's request for ex-
planation to Question No. 5, the remarks of the rcP_Ht 
could onl!T haYe clarified the doubt as to the 11eressi1:-
of the jury- to answer Question No. 5 at all. Thus, in 
approximately ten minutes, the jury returned, answering 
Questions 1, 2, 3, and 7. 
Question No. 3 was the keystone of this whole case. 
If the jury had answered it in the affirmative, then all the 
other nuances of the case, pregnant in Question No. :J, 
would have been horn, to surYiYe or die according to the 
amount of evidence the parties could muster regarding: 
(1) representations by plaintiffs (opinion or actionable); 
(2) knowledge of falsity by plaintiffs; (3) intent they liP 
acted on by the defendants; ( 4) whether these represe11t<1-
tions, if false, induced defendants to enter into the ron-
8 
tract; or ( 5) whether defendants entered into the agree-
ment with full knowledge of the facts, having relied on 
their own full information 
POINT III 
HAVING ANSWERED QUESTION NO. 3 IN 
THE NEGATIVE, THE JURY ~IADE MOOT 
ALL OTHER POINTS BELABORED IN DE-
FENDANTS' BRIEF. 
The trial court, under the evidence presented in this 
case, gave every instruction to which the defendant was 
entitled. 
All of defendant's argument on Point III is based 
on "vendor making false statement." The jury said he 
made no false statement concerning the business, with 
the intention that the defendants would rely thereon. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT COMPLAINS THAT THE 
.JURY'S ANS'\VERS TO INTERROGATORIES 
PROPOUNDED IN THE QUESTIONS 1 
THROUGH 8 WERE NOT IN PROPER FORM. 
HE DOES NOT COl\IPLAIN THAT THEY ARE 
UNCLEAR, EQUIVOCAL, OR INCAPABLE OF 
BEING UNDERSTOOD BY ALL CONCERNED. 
HE PURSUES THE SHADOW AND IGNORES 
THE SUBSTANCE OF THE LAW AS IT AP-
PLIES TO THE VERDICT IN THIS ACTION. 
The policy of the Utah Supreme Court in revie'v of 
jury verdicts was aptly set out in Webb v. Oli11 Mathieson 
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Chemical Corporatio11, 9 Utah 2d 273, 342 P. 2d 1094, a
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follows: 
"It is the declared policy of the Supreme Court 
to zealously protect the right of trial by jury and 
not to take issues from them and rule as a matter 
of law except in clear cases.'' 
This court has spoken many times on its power to 
review or change jury verdicts, Felice v. Riscarrli, 67 
Utah 171, 246 Pac. 535; James v. Robertson, 39 Utah 414, 
117 Pac. 1068: llf artindale v. Oregou Short Line Railroarl. 
48 Utah 464, 160 Pac. 275; Ta.ylor v. TVeber Co., 4 Utah 
2d 328, 293 P. 2d 925. 
This authority of the Supreme Court to review arnl 
the circumstance when it would review and change a ver-
dict was put to rest at last in Porter v. Price, 11 Utah 2c1 
80, 355 P. 2d 66, as follows : 
"Verdict of jury must not be set aside unless 
a reasonable man could not come to the same con-
clusion even when all of the evidence and infer-
ences fairly derived therefrom are taken in light 
most f~worable to (the) prevailing party." 
CONCLUSION 
If there was fraud invoked in the matter before this 
court, it was the fraud of defendants who told 1\fr. Motter 
they were going to give up the business, then procceckt1 
to sell the merchandise and truck it away to a place 
known onl~' to Batemans (T. 72, L. 18 to and inclndi11.g 
T. 73, L. 7). They then complain that plaintiff will not 
accept the gift of a return of the "gutted" busine,ss and 
forgive the outrage. 
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This court is obligated to look at the verdict herein 
and the rulings of the district court in this matter in a 
light most favorable to the plaintiff. Winchester v. Egan 
Farm Serr ice, 4 Utah 2d 129, 288 P. 2d 790; W rbb v. Olin 
Mathieson Chemical Corpora.tion, 9 Utah 2d 275, 342 P. 
2d 1094. In such a viewing, the unsupported allegations 
of defendant, in fact, his very testimony, substantiates 
plaintiff's testimony (T. 57, L. 13 to and including T. 157, 
L. 22). 
Plaintiff submits that the calculated and contradic-
tory testimony of defendants '''as manufactured out of 
whole cloth, after they had been se1Ted with Notice of 
Default by plaintiff and had consulted an attorney (T. 
75, L. 8 to and including T. 75, L. 25). 
Plaintiff respectfully directs the court's a.ttention 
to the remarks of the trial judge in denying defendants' 
"Jfotion For a .Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and 
:Motion for New Trial (T. 181, L. 10 to and including T. 
181, L. 27): 
'' * * * I do not believe that Mr. Bateman is so 
inexperienre(l as to he unaware of what he was 
doing here. I think he's an adult person, and I 
think he's been to rollege and graduated and hold-
ing a responsible position and so on, that he knew 
0xartly what he was doing and getting in this 
business.'' 
The Verdict of the .Jury and .Judgment on the Ver-
dict should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHARLES M. PICKETT 
Pickett Building 
St. George, Utah 
Attorney for Respondents 
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